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Abstract
Since the latest financial crisis, the idea of systemic risk has received
considerable interest. In particular, contagion effects arising from cross-
holdings between interconnected financial firms have been studied exten-
sively. Drawing inspiration from the field of complex networks, these
attempts are largely unaware of models and theories for credit risk of
individual firms. Here, we note that recent network valuation models ex-
tend the seminal structural risk model of Merton (1974). Furthermore, we
formally compute sensitivities to various risk factors – commonly known
as Greeks – in a network context. In particular, we propose the network
∆ as a quantitative measure of systemic risk and illustrate our findings
on some numerical examples.
Keywords: contingent claims analysis, financial contagion, Merton
model, network valuation, risk-neutral pricing, systemic risk, risk man-
agement, Greeks
1 Introduction
Since the latest financial crisis, the idea of systemic risk has received consid-
erable interest. Systemic risk denotes the risk that large parts of the entire
financial system, e.g. important markets for credit or liquidity, collapse. Gener-
ally, two approaches can be distinguished. On one hand, quantitative measures
of systemic risk have been proposed (Acharya et al. 2010, Adrian and Brunner-
meier 2016, Brownlees and Engle 2016) and estimated on market data. These
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measures strive to capture the statistical phenomena associated with large mar-
ket disruptions, e.g. tail-correlations or conditional shortfalls. As such, they
are estimated from market data without considering fundamentals about firm’s
portfolio compositions. On the other hand, complex network models start from
the structure of cross-holdings. Based on simple yet plausible assumptions about
insolvency resolution the impact of individual defaults on the entire financial sys-
tem is studied (Eisenberg and Noe 2001, Gai and Kapadia 2010, Upper 2011,
Battiston et al. 2012, Barucca et al. 2016). As such, these models are mainly
investigated by analytic and numeric means on random networks loosely re-
sembling real financial structures. Due to their stylized nature they are mostly
of illustrative nature, yet providing important insights into the dynamics of
financial contagion, e.g. on the appearance of a contagion window and the
robust-yet-fragile nature of financial systems.
1.1 Network valuations
The above network models analyze and simulate the contagion arising from
defaults/insolvencies of direct counterparties. To this end, they focus on the
cash flows of repaid liabilities – in full or in part – when contracts are settled.
This idea is most vividly expressed in the work by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) as
the “clearing payment vector”. An alternative viewpoint underlies the work by
Suzuki (2002) who considers a network of firms with cross-holdings of debt and
equity. Repayment of liabilities, i.e. debt cross-holdings, cannot be considered
from a cash flow perspective alone, as the value of equity cross-holdings needs to
be known as well. The model therefore extends the seminal Merton (1974) model
which expresses debt and equity values as derivative contracts on a single firms
assets to multiple firms with cross-holdings. From this perspective instead of a
consistent set of clearing payments, all contracts have to be valued consistently.
Interestingly, this strand of research has developed mostly unaware of clearing
models, even re-discovering Suzuki’s results several times (Elsinger 2009, Fischer
2014). Only recently Barucca et al. (2016) have shown that the idea of network
valuation actually unifies many models, including the ones by Eisenberg and
Noe (2001) and Battiston et al. (2012), under a common framework. Here, we
build on this framework to investigate risk in financial networks.
1.2 Greeks
In the context of a single firm, Merton (1974) has shown that equity can be
considered as a long call option and debt insurance as a short put option on
the firm’s asset value. Thus connecting credit risk with option pricing. Such
structural credit risk models have since been developed and used extensively to
assess and manage credit risk. Especially Moody’s KMV model has become
an industry standard in this respect and is routinely used to recover implied
probabilities of default from market price data.
Furthermore, option pricing provides a wide range of risk measures and
management techniques. The Greeks (Haug 2003a,b) are widely used to quantify
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sensitivities to several risk factors, e.g. interest rate, volatility and many more.
Consequently, they are routinely used in practice to evaluate and hedge the risk
of option portfolios. Delta hedging provides a well-known technique to reduce
portfolio risk and builds on the option’s ∆, measuring the sensitivity of the
option price to changes in the spot price of the underlying. Its importance is
reflected in the fact that options are routinely quoted in terms of their ∆. As
the other Greeks, ∆ is formally defined as a partial derivative.
In the context of network valuations, partial derivatives have been used a
few times to quantify sensitivities, be it to asset values (Liu and Staum 2010,
Demange 2018) or changes in the value of cross-holdings (Feinstein et al. 2017,
Karl 2015). Here, we extend this work in several ways. First we make use
of the implicit function theorem to derive the partial derivatives of network
consistent contract values. Interestingly, to our knowledge this seems to be
unknown to much of the community – a notable exception being the thesis of
Karl (2015). Second, we do not consider the ex-post values, i.e. at the time of
contract maturity/settlement, but instead consider the ex-ante market values
under the risk-neutral measure. In turn, we compute several first-order Greeks
and investigate their behavior in several examples. In particular, we propose
the network ∆ as a principled, quantitative measure of systemic risk.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical
notation and network valuation model. In section 3 we explain risk-neutral
pricing and derive a formal solution for the network Greeks. We illustrate our
results on some examples in section 4. Finally, we discuss implications of our
model and provide an outlook on future extensions in section 5. Major proofs
and computations are collected in the appendices. There we also relate our
results to previous studies, namely the threat index of Demange (2018) and the
local valuation framework of Barucca et al. (2016).
2 Model
2.1 Notation and mathematical preliminaries
Here we quickly summarize the mathematical notation employed in this paper.
We write vectors x,y ∈ Rn with bold lower case and matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n
with bold upper case letters. Individual entries of vectors and matrices are
written as xi, Aij . diag(x) denotes the n × n diagonal matrix D with entries
Dii = xi along its diagonal. The transpose of a matrix is denoted as A
T . All
products containing vectors and matrices are understood as standard matrix
products, e.g. AB denotes the matrix product of A and B, xx is undefined
whereas xTx is the scalar product of x with itself. Row- and column-wise
stacking of vectors or matrices is denoted by (x;y) and (x,y) respectively, i.e.
(x;y) is a 2n-dimensional vectors whereas (x,y) is a n× 2 matrix.
Random variables X,Y are written as upper case letters with individual
outcomes x, y denoted in lower case. Expectations are denoted as E[f(X)] and
understood with respect to the (joint) distribution of random variables within
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the brackets. Sometimes we use EQt to denote that the expectation is taken over
the risk-neutral measure Q, implicitly conditioned on the information filtration
upto time t.
2.2 Network valuation
Merton (1974) has shown that equity and firm debt can be considered as call
and put options on the firm’s value respectively. In this model, a single firm is
holding externally priced assets a and zero-coupon debt with nominal amount
d due at a single, fixed maturity T . Then, at time T the value of equity s and
the recovery value of debt r are given as
s = max{0, a− d} = (a− d)+, (1)
r = min{d, a} = d− (d− a)+ (2)
corresponding to an implicit call and put option respectively.
Suzuki (2002) and others (Elsinger 2009, Fischer 2014) have since generalized
this model to multiple firms with equity and debt cross-holdings. In this paper
we consider n firms. Each firm i = 1, . . . , n holds an external asset ai > 0 as
well as a fraction Msij of firm j’s equity and debt M
d
ij . Here, the investment
fractions Msij and M
d
ij are bounded between 0 and 1, i.e. 0 ≤ Ms,dij ≤ 1, and
the actual value invested in the equity of counterparty j is given as Msijsj . In
the following we require:
Assumption 1. There are no self-holdings, i.e. Msii = M
d
ii = 0 for all i =
1, . . . , n, nor short positions, i.e. Msij ,M
d
ij ≥ 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n. Moreover,
the fraction of equity and debt held by any counterparty cannot exceed unity, i.e.
for all j = 1, . . . , n we require that∑
i
Msij ≤ 1 and
∑
i
Mdij ≤ 1 . (3)
Furthermore, some equity and debt are held externally, i.e. there exist firms js
and jd such that ∑
i
Msijs < 1 and
∑
i
Mdijd < 1 . (4)
That is, M s and Md are strictly (left) sub-stochastic matrices.
Now, the value of all assets vi held by firm i is given by
vi = ai +
n∑
j=1
Msijsj +
n∑
j=1
Mdijrj . (5)
4
Correspondingly, the firm’s equity and recovery value of debt are given by
si = max
0, ai +∑
j
Msijsj +
∑
j
Mdijrj − di
 , (6)
ri = min
di, ai +∑
j
Msijsj +M
d
ijrj
 . (7)
In matrix notation, i.e. collecting equity and debt values into vectors s =
(s1, . . . , sn)
T and r = (r1, . . . , rn)
T respectively, this can be rewritten as
s = max
{
0,a+M ss+Mdr − d} , (8)
r = min
{
d,a+M ss+Mdr
}
(9)
Thus, the firms’ equity and debt values are endogenously defined as the solution
of a fixed point. This is readily seen when collecting equity and debt row-wise
into a single vector x = (s; r), i.e. s = x1:n and r = x(n+1):2n, and writing
x = g(a,x) (10)
with the vector valued function g = (gs1, . . . , g
s
n, g
r
1, . . . , g
r
n)
T where for i =
1, . . . , n
gsi (a,x) = max
0, ai +∑
j
Msijxj +
∑
j
Mdijxn+j − di
 , (11)
gri (a,x) = min
di, ai +∑
j
Msijxj +
∑
j
Mdijxn+j
 . (12)
(13)
Each of the functions gsi and g
r
i is continuous and increasing in a and x. To-
gether with assumption 1 it follows that the fixed point of equation (10) is
positive and unique.
Theorem 1. Suppose that assumption 1 holds. Then, for each value of external
assets a > 0 there is a positive and unique x solving equation (10).
Proof. Our model is a special case of the one considered by Fischer (2014)
with k = 1 and d1r1,r0 ≡ d. Furthermore, Fischer’s assumption 3.1 holds by
assumption 1 and assumptions 3.6 and 3.7 are trivial as our nominal debt vector
d is constant. The result then follows by his theorem 3.8 (iv).
It is interesting to consider the model from the perspective of an external
investor. Whereas the internal value of all firms is given by v = s + r, stock
and debt holdings are diluted by cross-holdings. Considering firm i, a fraction∑
jM
s
ji of its stocks is held by other firms j. Thus only a fraction 1−
∑
jM
s
ji
is available to outside investors and similarly for debt.
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Definition 1. The value vouti of firm i available to outside investors is defined
as
vouti = (1−
∑
j
Msji)si + (1−
∑
j
Mdji)ri . (14)
While the internal value exceeds the value of external assets, i.e.
v = s+ r (15)
= max
{
0,a+M ss+Mdr − d}+ min{d,a+M ss+Mdr} (16)
= a+M ss+Mdr > a, (17)
this is not the case for external investors.
Proposition 1. The total value available to outside investors equals the total
value of external assets, i.e.
∑n
i=1 v
out
i =
∑n
i=1 ai.
Proof. From equation (15) the total value of all firms is given as
∑
i
vi =
∑
i
(si + ri) =
∑
i
ai +∑
j
Msijsj +
∑
j
Mdijrj
 (18)
Outside investors hold a total value of∑
i
vouti =
∑
i
(1−
∑
j
Msji)si +
∑
i
(1−
∑
j
Mdji)ri (19)
=
∑
i
(si + ri)−
∑
i
∑
j
Msjisi −
∑
i
∑
j
Mdjiri (20)
=
∑
i
ai +∑
j
Msijsj +
∑
j
Mdijrj
−∑
j
∑
i
Msijsj −
∑
j
∑
i
Mdijrj
(21)
=
∑
i
ai (22)
This point, that asset values are inflated by cross-holdings compared to the
actual underlying external values accessible by investors, has also been noted by
Fischer (2014). In general, vi 6= vouti and thus, it can be beneficial or detremen-
tial for an outside investor, if firm i enters into cross-holding agreements with
counterparties. Indeed, as external asset value is conserved in the model, any
change in the structure of cross-holdings gives rise to a zero-sum redistribution
between external investors.
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3 Network Greeks
How is risk distributed in and by the network of cross-holdings? Risk in fi-
nancial derivatives is routinely measured and management using the Greeks or
risk sensitivities Haug (2003a,b). In this section, we build on the above model
which considers the value of network claims as an extension of Merton’s model.
Accordingly, firm equity and debt values under cross-holdings are derivative
contracts and can be priced and managed as such. In particular, we compute
“network Greeks” to investigate systemic risk arising from interconnected finan-
cial firms. To our knowledge this idea has not been investigated before.
3.1 Risk-neutral valuation
Denoting the unique solution of equation (10) by x∗(a), we can consider the
corresponding value of equity and debt claims as derivative contracts on the
underlying a. Accordingly, the ex-ante market price at time t < T is given as
xt = EQt [e−rτx∗(AT )] (23)
with the riskless interest rate r and time to maturity τ = T−t. The expectation
is taken with respect to the risk-neutral measure Q of external asset values a
at maturity T . In the following, we assume that the risk-neutral asset values
follow a multi-variate geometric Brownian motion, i.e.
dAit = rA
i
t dt+ σiA
i
t dW
i
t (24)
with possibly correlated Wiener processes W it , i.e. E[ dW it dW
j
t ] = ρij dt with
ρi,i = 1. It is well-known that the solution At is given by
Ait = a
i
0e
(r− 12σ2i )t+σiW it (25)
where ai0 > 0 denotes the initial value andWt is multivariate normal distributed
with mean 0 and covariance matrix tC with entries Cij = ρij . Note that Wt
can be obtained from independent standard normal variates Z ∼ N (0, In×n)
as Wt =
√
tLZ with LTL = C. We will use this representation in the next
section to express the risk-neutral market value of equity and debt contracts as
xt = EQt [e−rτx∗ (aT (Z))] = E
Q
t
[
e−rτx∗
(
ate
(r− 12σ2)τ+
√
τ diag(σ)LZ
)]
. (26)
3.2 Formal solution
The Greeks quantify the sensitivities of derivative prices to changes in underlying
parameters. As a starting point, in this paper, we consider first-order Greeks
only. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of equity and debt prices
accounting for cross-holdings with respect to current asset values ∆ = ∂xt∂at ,
volatilities V = ∂xt∂σ , risk-free interest rate ρ = ∂xt∂r and time to maturity Θ =
−∂xt∂τ .
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Denoting all parameters of interest by θ = (at,σ, r, τ)
T and considering that
the asset value aτ (Z; θ) depends on the random variate Z and these parameters,
we need to compute the following derivatives
∂
∂θ
xt =
∂
∂θ
EQt [e−rτx∗(aT (Z; θ))] (27)
= EQt
[(
∂
∂θ
e−rτ
)
x∗(aT (Z; θ)) + e−rτ
(
∂
∂θ
x∗(aT (Z; θ))
)]
(28)
where we have used Leibniz’s rule to exchange the order of expectation and
differentiation.
By the chain rule of differentiation we obtain
∂
∂θ
x∗(aτ (Z; θ)) =
∂
∂a
x∗(a) |a=aτ (Z;θ)
∂
∂θ
aτ (Z; θ) . (29)
Note that ∂∂ax
∗(a) is the derivative of the fixed point solving equation (10). In
order to compute it, we make use of the implicit function theorem. A version of
the theorem by Halkin (1974) is adopted to our notation:
Theorem 2. Let U ⊂ Rm, V ⊂ Rn and f : U × V → Rn a continuously
differentiable function. Suppose that
f(x∗,y∗) = 0 (30)
at a point (x∗,y∗) ∈ U×V and that the Jacobian matrices Jf ,xf(x,y),Jf ,yf(x,y)
of partial derivatives exist at (x∗,y∗). Further, Jf ,y is invertible at this point.
Then, there exists a neighbourhood U∗ ⊂ U and a continuously differentiable
function h : U∗ → Rn with
h(x∗) = y∗ (31)
and
f(x,h(x)) = 0 ∀x ∈ U∗ . (32)
Moreover, the partial derivatives of h with respect to x ∈ U∗ are given as
∂
∂x
h(x) = − [Jf ,yf(x,h(x))]−1n×n
[
∂
∂x
f(x,h(x))
]
n×m
(33)
Note that the function g(a,x) defined in equation (11) is continuous and
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almost everywhere differentiable. The partial derivatives are given by
∂
∂sj
gsi (a,x) =
{
Msij if firm i is solvent
0 otherwise
(34)
∂
∂sj
gri (a,x) =
{
0 if firm i is solvent
Msij otherwise
(35)
∂
∂rj
gsi (a,x) =
{
Mdij if firm i is solvent
0 otherwise
(36)
∂
∂rj
gri (a,x) =
{
0 if firm i is solvent
Mdij otherwise
(37)
∂
∂aj
gsi (a,x) =
{
1 if i = j and firm i is solvent
0 otherwise
(38)
∂
∂aj
gri (a,x) =
{
0 if i = j and firm i is solvent
1 otherwise
. (39)
Here, a firm i is solvent if its asset value vi is sufficient to repay its nominal debt
di, i.e. vi = ai +
∑n
j=1M
s
ijsj +
∑n
j=1M
d
ijrj > di. The derivatives of g exist
everywhere except for the boundary case vi = di. Defining the solvency vector
ξ = (1vi>d1(v1), . . . ,1vn>dn(vn)), the partial derivatives of g with respect to x
can be collected in a matrix as follows
∂
∂x
g(a,x) =
 diag(ξ)M s diag(ξ)Md
diag(1n − ξ)M s diag(1n − ξ)Md
 (40)
= diag ((ξ; 1n − ξ))
 M s Md
M s Md
 (41)
Thus, defining f(a,x) = x − g(a,x) we obtain by the implicit function
theorem 2
Corollary 1. The partial derivatives of x∗(a) are given by
∂
∂a
x∗(a) =
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
]−1  diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
 (42)
Proof. Use that ∂∂xf(a,x) = I2n×2n− ∂∂xg(a,x) and ∂∂af(a,x) = − ∂∂ag(a,x).
Then, the result follows from theorem 2 and ∂∂ag(a,x) =
[
diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
]
. As
explained below, assumption 1 ensures that ∂∂xf(a,x) is invertible as required.
Finally, combining equation (27) and (29) with corollary 1 we formally com-
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pute the network Greeks as
∂
∂θ
xt = EQt
[(
∂
∂θ
e−rτ
)
x∗(aT (Z; θ))
+e−rτ
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
]−1  diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
 ∂
∂θ
aT (Z; θ)
 (43)
where the expectation is well-defined as the derivatives exist almost everywhere,
i.e. except for a set of measure zero.
Note that the effect of the cross-holding network is fully captured by the
matrix
W =
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
]−1
=
I2n×2n − diag ((ξ; 1n − ξ))
 M s Md
M s Md
−1
(44)
weighting the contributions from the direct sensitivities ∂∂θaτ (Z; θ). In case of
no cross-holdings, M s,Md ≡ 0, this reduces to the identity matrix by equation
(40).
The network effect captured by the weighting matrixW has some interesting
implications:
1. It can be considered as a Katz-Bonacich type centrality, i.e. of the form
(I − αM)−1. In our case, the weighting factor α is different for different
firms and endogenously derived from their solvency status ξ ∈ {0, 1}.
Here, we note that Katz-Bonacich centrality exists as long as the largest
eigenvalue of αM is below one. Thus, from this connection we obtain that
the inverse in equation (44) exists, as ξ ∈ {0, 1}n and we assumed sub-
stochastic cross-holding matrices M s,Md by assumption 1. Furthermore,
it opens up the possibility for targeted interventions striving to optimally
control node centralities (Reiffers-Masson et al. 2015).
Moreover, using the expansion
(I − αM)−1 =
∞∑
k=0
(αM)
k
= I + αM + (αM)
2
+ . . . (45)
it is clear that the network always amplifies initial shocks.
2. The effective network changes based on the distance to default of firms.
Consider the case when all firms are solvent, i.e. ξ = 1. Then, from
corollary 1 the sensitivity of equity and debt values to changing asset
prices are given as
∂
∂a
x∗(a) =
[
(In×n −M s)−1
0
]
. (46)
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Thus, only the cross-holdings of equity are visible and debt values are
uneffected as all contracts are honored at their nominal values. In contrast,
when all firms are insolvent, i.e. ξ = 0, the sensitivities are given by
∂
∂a
x∗(a) =
[
0
(In×n −Md)−1
]
. (47)
with only debt cross-holdings visible. This implies that the Greeks of
market values, being averages as of equation (43), can change substantially
if the default probability of companies changes. E.g. debt cross-holdings
might be almost invisible under normal circumstances, yet drive the risk
sensitivities in a crisis when default probabilities rise. Suggesting that
systemic risk management must take into account stressed scenarios, i.e.
by elevated default probabilities, to be meaningful in a crisis.
Based on this observation, we hypothesize that these extreme cases corre-
spond to the largest sensitivities of equity and debt respectively.
Hypothesis 1. Let assumption 1 hold and split the partial derivatives of
x∗(a) as [
us
ud
]
=
∂
∂a
x∗(a) . (48)
Then, us is monotonically increasing and ud is monotonically decreasing
when considered as a function of ξ.
A proof under slightly stronger assumptions can be found in appendix A.
3. In case of cross-holdings of debt only, Demange (2018) has proposed a
threat index µ measuring the spill-over potential of each firm. In appendix
B we derive the exact relation with our model and show how the index µ
can be computed from the partial derivatives derived in corollary 1.
Based on the idea of a threat index, one might be tempted to consider the
expectation EQt [ ∂∂AT x
∗(AT )] as a measure of firms’ spill-overs towards
each other. In particular, the total impact pii of a change to the external
asset of firm i on the value of all other firms might be measured as
pi = EQt [
∑
i
∂vi
∂AT
] (49)
= EQt [1T
∂
∂AAT
x∗(AT )]T (50)
= EQt
[
1TW (diag(ξ); diag(1n − ξ))
]T
. (51)
While pii might provide a useful proxy for a firm’s systemic risk, the Greeks
in general consider a firm’s risk differently. In particular, the total risk sen-
sitivity of all banks with respect to the parameters θ cannot be computed
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as∑
i
∂
∂θ
(xt)i 6= 1TEQt
[(
∂
∂θ
e−rτ
)
x∗(aT (Z; θ))
]
+ e−rτpiTEQt
[
∂
∂θ
aT (Z; θ)
]
(52)
as ξ and ∂∂θaτ (Z; θ) both depend on Z and are generally not independent.
Note that pi can be interpreted as the aggregate impact, i.e. on all firms, of
an asset price shock at maturity. Similarly, 1T∆ = 1TEQt [e−rτ ∂∂atx
∗(AT )]
quantifies the aggregate impact of asset price shocks at current market
values. As this is arguably more relevant for risk management purposes,
we propose ∆Total = 1T∆ as a better suited measure of systemic risk. In
the examples in section 4 we illustrate and comment in more detail on
their differences.
4. Risk management is also interesting from the perspective of outside in-
vestors. In this case, from proposition 1 we obtain that any risk is redis-
tributed between them without amplification as compared to the risk on
external assets directly:
∂
∂θ
n∑
i=1
vouti =
n∑
i=1
∂
∂θ
ai (53)
In particular, for the partial derivatives with respect to the external assets
a, we find that
∑
i
∂
∂av
out
i = n, i.e. on average each investor bears a risk
of 1 as he would when holding a single external asset directly. Yet, in
general the risk is redistributed between outside investors, suggesting to
view the individual
∂vouti
∂a vectors as the weights of the implicit portfolio
that the investor holds in external assets.
3.3 Local approximation
Barucca et al. (2016) have compared several network contagion models and
unified them in terms of network valuations solving for a self-consistent fixed
point solution. In particular, they showed that this includes many existing
models, including the seminal model by Eisenberg and Noe (2001) and the well-
known DebtRank contagion process (Battiston et al. 2012), valuing assets ex-
post at maturity. In the case of ex-ante valuations, i.e. at current market prices,
they proposed a local approximation The idea being that each firm evaluates its
portfolio locally, i.e. by pricing external assets and holdings of other companies
at market prices.
Here, we discuss how this approximation relates to our setup. For simplicity
we consider the case of debt cross-holdings only. Then, the market value of debt
of firm i solves
ri = min{di, ai +
∑
j
Mdijrj} . (54)
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This can be written in the form of valuation defined by Barucca et al. (2016) as
ri = di1Ei>0 + (Ei + di)
+
1Ei≤0 (55)
with Ei = ai+
∑
jM
d
ijrj−di = vi−di. Using the valuation functions of Barucca
et al. (2016)
Ve(Ei) = 1 (56)
Veij(Ej) = 1Ej>0 +
(
Ej + dj
dj
)+
1Ej≤0 (57)
the market value of equity reads
Ei = aiVe(E) +
∑
j
MdijdjVij(E)− di . (58)
Notice that in our setup the total liability of firm i is given by di and a fraction∑
jM
d
ji of it is payed to other firms. Further, the nominal amount lend by i to
j is given as Mdijdj . Thus equation (58) corresponds to equation (7) of Barucca
et al. (2016).
Finally, using an ex-ante valuation, e.g. based on the Black-Scholes formula,
to compute market values at time t when nominal debt payments are due at
maturity T , we obtain
Ve(Ei(t)) = 1 (59)
Veij(Ej(t)) = E
Q
t
[
1Ej>0 +
(
Ej + dj
dj
)+
1Ej≤0
]
(60)
= EQt
[
1Ej(T )>0
]
+ EQt
[
vi
di
1Ej(T )≤0
]
. (61)
Thus, the nominal holding Mdijdj is adjusted by the risk-neutral probability of
non-default EQt [1Ej(T )>0] and the expected shortfall E
Q
t [
vi
di
1Ej(T )≤0]. Another
interpretation sees the resulting market price of debt as its nominal value insured
by a short Black-Scholes put option, i.e.
dj
(
1Ej>0 +
vj
dj
1Ej≤0
)
= dj − (dj − vj)+ (62)
as Ej ≤ 0 ⇔ vj ≤ dj . The ex-ante valuation of firm ith equity can thus be
written as
Ei(t) = ai(t) +
∑
j
Mdij (dj − cput(Ej(t) + dj , dj))− di (63)
where cput(vj , dj) denotes the Black-Scholes price of a put option on the value of
firm j with ex-ante value vj and strike dj . Notice that this includes additional
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approximations besides the standard Black-Scholes assumptions. First, since vj
denotes the value of a firms asset portfolio, equity and debt are actually basket
options and would need to be priced accordingly. Further, the volatility of
the portfolio value σVj is assumed known and fixed instead of being an implicit
function of the volatility of the external asset σ as in the exact model. Secondly,
further extensions such as strategic default (Leland 1994) or roll-over risk (He
and Xiong 2012) are easily included in this setup by plugging in the according
pricing functions.
Denoting the fixed point of self-consistent market values by E∗(a) and em-
ploying the inverse function theorem again it is easy to show that the derivatives
of the local approximation are given by
∂
∂a
E∗ =
(
I −Md diag(d) ∂
∂E
V(E∗)
)−1
I (64)
=
(
I +Md diag(∆put(E
∗ + d,d))
)−1
, (65)
i.e. the cross-holding matrix is weighted by the ∆s of the local valuation func-
tions. Interestingly, a very similar result has been independently derived by
Ota (2014) who has considered the propagation of asset price shocks when firms
adjust the market values of their portfolio holdings. Ota (2014) introduced the
notion of marginal contagion and showed that an initial asset price shock ∆IA0
is amplified by a network of debt cross-holdings as(
I −MdΦ)−1 ∆IA0 (66)
where Φ is a diagonal matrix containing the risk-neutral probabilities of default
for each firm, i.e. Φ = diag(1−EQt [ξ]) in our notation. Thus, the cross-holdings
Md are risk adjusted by the probabilities of default instead of the valuation ∆s
as derived above for the local approximation proposed by Barucca et al. (2016).
When ignoring default correlations, we can provide yet another connection
with ex-ante value of the partial derivatives computed in corollary 1. Consid-
ering the case of debt cross-holdings only, it suffices to consider the debt values
r∗(a). The partial derivatives are then given by
∂
∂a
r∗(a) =
(
I − diag(1− ξ)Md)−1 diag(1− ξ) (67)
Series expanding the matrix inverse, the risk-neutral ex-ante value can be com-
puted as
EQt [
∂
∂a
r∗(a)] = EQt
[ ∞∑
k=0
(
diag(1− ξ)Md)k diag(1− ξ)] (68)
=
∞∑
k=0
EQt
[(
diag(1− ξ)Md)k diag(1− ξ)] . (69)
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In general, the expectation of matrix powers is difficult to evaluate. But, assum-
ing that defaults occur independently, i.e. EQt [ξiξj ] = E
Q
t [ξi]E
Q
t [ξj ], the above
expression can be approximated as
EQt [
∂
∂a
r∗(a)] ≈
∞∑
k=0
EQt [diag(1− ξ)]
(
Md
)k EQt [diag(1− ξ)] (70)
=
(
I − diag(1− EQt [ξ])Md
)−1
diag(1− EQt [ξ]) . (71)
This is most easily seen when noting that(
diag(1− ξ)Md)2
ij
=
∑
k
(1− ξi)Mdik(1− ξk)Mdkj (72)(
diag(1− ξ)Md)3
ij
=
∑
kl
(1− ξi)Mdik(1− ξk)Mdkl(1− ξl)Mdlj , . . . (73)
making it clear that the expectations over ξ can be carried out independently.
This expression is very similar to the marginal contagion proposed by Ota
(2014). Yet, a major difference is that the risk adjustment by the risk neu-
tral default probabilities 1 − EQt [ξ] is done along the incoming instead of the
outgoing connections. This leads to different risk amplification as the matrices
diag(1 − EQt [ξ])Md and Md diag(1 − EQt [ξ]) are different in general. A possi-
ble interpretation could be, that each firm adjusts the value of counterparties
for their default probability when managing its risk individually. Viewed from
a network perspective, it should instead adjust for its own default probability
to account for its contagion effect on other firms. Nevertheless, equation (70)
is also an approximation as Demange (2018) has shown that defaults are not
independent, but positively correlated in case of debt cross-holdings. Thus, by
hypothesis 1 the approximation underestimates the amplification of risk in fi-
nancial networks. With these remarks, we leave it to future work to explore and
understand the implications and differences of different local approximations
and turn to numerical illustraions of the network Greeks.
4 Numerical illustrations
Here, we consider several examples illustrating our formal solution. Starting
with a symmetric, fully connected firm network which can be solved analytically
by being reduced to a single representative firm, we then simulate the model
with two firms and on large random networks.
4.1 Symmetric example
As a first example, we consider n identical firms. Each firm holds a fractions
ws
n−1 and
wd
n−1 with parameters 0 ≤ ws, wd < 1 of each counter parties equity
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and debt respectively. Under these assumptions equation (6) simplifies to
si = max
0, ai +∑
j
ws
n− 1sj +
∑
j
wd
n− 1rj − di
 , (74)
ri = min
di, ai +∑
j
ws
n− 1sj +
∑
j
wd
n− 1rj
 . (75)
Furthermore, we consider a symmetric situation of identical firms, all having the
same nominal debt di = d, ∀i and external asset ai = a,∀i. Then, by symmetry
si = s and ri = r, ∀i, reducing the problem to a one-dimensional fixed point
s = max{0, a+ wss+ wdr − d} (76)
r = min{d, a+ wss+ wdr} . (77)
Now, consider two cases corresponding to zero and positive equity:
s = 0: Assuming r < d we obtain the recursion r = a + wss + wdr = a + wdr
with solution r∗ = a
1−wd . This solution is consistent with our assumption
as long as r∗ < d⇔ a < (1− wd)d.
s > 0: In this case, we can consistently assume r = d. Then, s = a + wss +
wdd− d with solution s∗ = a−(1−wd)d1−ws . Indeed, s∗ > 0⇔ a > (1− wd)d.
Thus, the two solution branches are mutually exclusive and connect at the
default boundary given by a = (1−wd)d. It is easily checked that this is indeed
the condition where the firms value equals its nominal debt, i.e. r∗ + s∗ = d.
Combining the two case, we obtain the solution
s∗ =
{
a−(1−wd)d
1−ws if ξ = 1
0 otherwise
(78)
r∗ =
{
d if ξ = 1
a
1−wd otherwise
, (79)
where the solvency indicator ξ = 1 if a > (1 − wd)d and ξ = 0 otherwise.
Figure 1 illustrates the solution for different combinations of ws and wd. In
all cases d = 1 is fixed without loss of generality. Notice how the value of the
firms is increased by cross-holdings with a clear difference between equity and
debt holdings. Whereas debt cross-holdings shift the default boundary to lower
values and thus increase the value of the firms when these are insolvent, equity
cross-holdings are ineffective in this regime and instead lead to elevated values
when firms are solvent. Furthermore, they do not provide a risk-sharing benefit
leaving the default boundary unchanged. As shown below, this is an artefact
of the symmetric solution with a single external asset considered here and not
true in general.
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Figure 1: Solution of equation (80) for cross-holding fractions of ws, wd ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6}.
Assuming a single external asset At following a geometric Brownian motion,
we can compute the market values of debt and equity analytically. As detailed
in appendix C.1, we obtain
st =
1
1− ws
(
atΦ(d+)− (1− wd)de−rτΦ(d−)
)
(80)
rt =
1
1− wd
(
atΦ(−d+) + (1− wd)de−rτ (1− Φ(−d−))
)
(81)
where Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal and
d± are defined as
d± =
ln at
(1−wd)d + (r ± 12σ2)τ√
τσ
. (82)
As in the Merton model, equity can be considered a long call option and the
recovery value of debt is insured by a short put. Indeed, it is easily checked that
equation (80) can be written as
st =
1
1− wsCBS(at, (1− w
d)d, r, τ, σ) (83)
rt =
1
1− wd
(
e−rτ (1− wd)d− PBS(at, (1− wd)d, r, τ, σ)
)
(84)
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with CBS , PBS denoting the Black-Scholes price of a call and put option with
spot price at and strike (1 − wd)d respectively. Overall, two effects arise from
cross-holdings. First, the default boundary corresponding to the nominally re-
quired repayment is lowered to (1 − wd)d. Second, equity and debt values are
amplified by 11−ws and
1
1−wd respectively. Figure 2 shows the market values
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Figure 2: Market values of equity and debt for cross-holding fractions of ws, wd ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6} and volatilities σ = 0.1, 0.4.
of equity and debt together with the total value of the firm. Compared to the
values at maturity, i.e. as in figure 1, the market values are smoothed with
equity values increased and debt values decreased corresponding to the implicit
long call and short put option respectively. At higher volatilities this effect is
even more pronounced. Depending on the relative strength of equity to debt
cross-holdings, volatility thereby increases (ws > wd) or decreases (ws < wd)
the firms value.
To compute the Greeks, we can either resort to corollary 1, as illustrated in
appendix C.2, or simply use the corresponding Greeks from the Black-Scholes
formula. Indeed, equation (83) implies that all Greeks are analytic being am-
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plifications of the standard Black-Scholes Greeks.
∂st
∂at
=
1
1− wsΦ(d+) (85)
∂rt
∂at
=
1
1− wdΦ(−d+) (86)
∂st
∂σ
=
1
1− ws atϕ(d+)
√
τ (87)
∂rt
∂σ
= − 1
1− wd atϕ(d+)
√
τ (88)
−∂st
∂τ
= − 1
1− ws
(
atϕ(d+)σ
2
√
τ
+ r(1− wd)de−rτΦ(d−)
)
(89)
−∂rt
∂τ
=
1
1− wd
(
r(1− wd)de−rτ + atϕ(d+)σ
2
√
τ
− r(1− wd)de−rτΦ(−d−)
)
(90)
∂st
∂r
=
1
1− ws (1− w
d)dτe−rτΦ(d−) (91)
∂rt
∂r
= − 1
1− wd
(
(1− wd)dτe−rτ − (1− wd)dτe−rτΦ(−d−)
)
(92)
Figure 3 shows ∆,V,Θ and ρ with the parameters as above. Compared to no
cross-holdings ws = wd = 0 the amplification is clearly visible. Interestingly,
while risks are generally high in distress, i.e. when firms are close to their
default boundary, the risks with respect to σ, τ and r vanish with dropping
asset values, i.e. outright default. ∆ instead is high and amplified by the
cross-holdings of debt in this case. Furthermore, ∆ risk is always positive, in
contrast to the other risks which are hedged between equity and debt holders.
Overall, this suggests ∆ as a suitable measure of the systemic risk arising from
cross-holdings. It is also interesting to compare ∆ for the value of the firm,
i.e. ∂v∂at =
1
1−wsΦ(d+) +
1
1−wdΦ(−d+) with the systemic risk index pi which
is computed in appendix C.2 as pi = 11−wsΦ(d−) +
1
1−wdΦ(−d−). Thus, the
difference of the Black-Scholes model between percent moneyness and ∆ also
appears in this setup.
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Figure 3: Greeks ∆,V, ρ and Θ for cross-holding fractions of ws, wd ∈
{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6} and volatilities σ = 0.1, 0.4.
20
4.2 Random networks example
We consider again n firms, each now holding a different external asset ai.
This breaks the symmetry of the solution considered above and is in general
not analytically tractable. Indeed, already in case of n = 2 firms the risk-
neutral expectations in equation (26) are intractable, even though the fixed
point x∗(AT ) can be solved analytically (Suzuki 2002, Karl 2015). Figure 4
illustrates the joint distribution of firm values arising from independent log-
normally distributed external assets. Parameters are choosen as in figure 6 of
Karl (2015), i.e. r = 0, τ = 1, a0 = 1, σ = 1 for the log normal distribution of
AT and w
d
12 = w
d
21 = 0.95, w
s
12 = w
s
21 = 0, d1 = d2 = 11.3 for the cross-holdings
and nominal debt of both firms. Compared to the value of external assets,
firm values are increased considerably by the debt cross-holdings and strongly
distorted. Especially joint defaults are non independent and accompanied by
strongly correlated firm values.
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Figure 4: External asset and firm values for two firms with parameters r =
0, τ = 1, a0 = 1, σ = 1 for the log normal distribution of AT and w
d
12 = w
d
21 =
0.95, ws12 = w
s
21 = 0, d1 = d2 = 11.3 as in figure 6 of Karl (2015).
Thus, in this section we resort to numerical methods in order to compute
network Greeks. In particular, we use Monte-Carlo integration to approximate
the risk neutral expectation of equation (43). Furthermore, as in Gai and Kapa-
dia (2010) we consider debt cross-holdings only. The network of cross-holdings
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is generated at random according to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, i.e. each firm
is connected to each counterparty with a fixed probability p. The number of
incoming kin and outgoing connections kout then follow Poisson distributions,
both with a mean 〈k〉 = np. The Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model exhibits a phase transition
at 〈k〉 = 1 where a giant component, i.e. connected subgraph infinite size in
the thermodynamic limit n → ∞, of connected firms appears. Here, we adjust
the connection probabilities such that the average number of connected coun-
terparties covers this transition and varies between 0 and 5. The actual weights
of cross-holdings, i.e. Md, are then obtained by scaling the random adjacency
matrices such that
∑
iM
d
ij = w
d ∀j = 1, . . . , n whenever j has any outgoing
connection. Otherwise,
∑
iM
d
ij = k
out
j = 0. To illustrate the effect of different
strength of debt cross-holdings wd is varied between 0 and 0.6. Note that in
the simulation studies of Gai and Kapadia (2010) the incoming connections,
corresponding to the investment portfolio of each firm, are scaled such that the
same total amount is held with each counterparty. In our case, this would corre-
spond to requiring that Mdij =
wd
kini
which, in general, cannot be ensured together
with the above constraint on the outgoing connections. The Sinkhorn-Knopp
algorithm (Sinkhorn and Knopp 1967, Idel 2016) allows to achieve fixed row
and column sums simultaneously by iteratively rescaling rows and columns. On
matrices with some entries exactly zero, as in our case of firms not holding debt
from every possible counterparty, such a rescaling is not always possible and the
algorithm does not necessarily converge. Thus, in simulations a rejection step
is required changing the support of the random network example. Yet, as the
results were almost unchanged, all simulations in this section are based on the
simpler version of scaling the outgoing connections only, i.e.
∑
iM
d
ij = w
d ∀j.
Note that this does not leave the incoming connections unconstrained but fixes
their average weight at wd as well as 1n
∑
j(
∑
iM
d
ij) = w
d = 1n
∑
i(
∑
jM
d
ij).
Each firm is assumed to hold a different external asset, whose values at ma-
turity are independent and log normally distributed. We fix the risk neutral
interest rate r = 0, time to maturity τ = 1 and volatility σ = 0.4, varying the
initial asset prices between a0 = 0.1 and 2.5. Note that by equation (26) this
fixes the market values of debt and equity of each firm. Thus, in contrast to Gai
and Kapadia (2010), we cannot fix the fraction of external assets av and capital
ratios sv independently. Instead they are derived from the market prices follow-
ing from the chosen parameters. Figure 5 shows the resulting values together
with the market prices of equity and debt as well as the default probability.
For each combination of average connectivity 〈k〉, external asset value a0 and
strength of debt cross-holdings wd, we simulated 1000 networks of n = 60 firms.
This size was chosen as it showed small finite size effects, yet is small enough
to efficiently compute network valuations and partial derivatives. For each net-
work, 700 normal random vector Z where drawn and used to compute market
prices (equation (26)) and network Greeks (equation (27)). The fixed point
x∗(aT (Z)) was found by Picard iteration of the map g defined in equation (11)
which was shown to work efficiently in this model (Hain and Fischer 2015).
Figures show the mean values over all random networks, asset price draws. As
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on average all firms are symmetric under the scaled Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model, we also
averaged over firms, i.e. showing values for a typical firm.
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Figure 5: Market values of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random debt cross-holding networks of
60 firms. At all strength wd of cross-holdings equity, debt and total value of firms
increase with diversification, i.e. average connectivity 〈k〉. For comparison with
Gai and Kapadia (2010) also the capital ratio, default probability and fraction
of external assets are shown. Note that these are derived from market prices and
thus endogenous in our model. Parameters are r = 0, τ = 1, σ = 0.4,M s = 0
and a0, wd, 〈k〉 varying as denoted in the figure.
Figure 5 clearly illustrates the beneficial effect of debt cross-holdings. For
a fixed spot value of external assets a0, the market prices of equity and debt
increase with the number 〈k〉 and strength wd of connections. Correspondingly,
this diversification benefit leads to reduced default probabilities. Despite the
wide set of parameters considered, few combinations lead to values of capital
ratios of ≈ 4%, default probabilities of a few percent and fractions of external
assets of ≈ 80% which were considered realistic in Gai and Kapadia (2010). At
present, we are not sure if this is a fundamental limitation of the model, i.e.
missing important, qualitative features of real markets, or could be remedied by
more carefully chosen parameters.
Next, in order to study the impact of network parameters on systemic risk,
we compute the network Greeks. Fig. 6 shows the results for some selected
connectivities and should be compared to figure 3. Again, as firms are on
average symmetric in our model, we show the average total impact on all firms,
e.g. ∆̂Total = 1T∆ 1n1 which is denoted as “Value ∆” in the figure. As in the
case of the strictly symmetric solution, debt and equity react differently to risk
factors. ∆̂Total is strongly amplified at low external asset values by debt cross-
holdings, increasing with both the number and strength of connections. With
the chosen parameters the amplification factor is bounded by 1
1−wd due to the
employed scaling of cross-holding positions. Overall, the Greeks exhibit a similar
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behavior as in the strictly symmetric case. Interestingly, the new parameter of
average connectivity 〈k〉 tends to decrease the sensitivities to most risk factors
except for ∆ which is strongly amplified. The dampening effect is stronger on
equity though such that the firms values are no longer V,Θ or ρ-neutral.
Now, we focus on ∆ which is readily interpreted as the (first-order) impact
of asset price shocks. Thus, it should be comparable to contagion arising from
defaults as in the model of Gai and Kapadia (2010). In this model, the appear-
ance of a contagion window was noted: Contagion starts to spread at the phase
transition of the random network, i.e. when firms are sufficiently connected
such that large connected clusters appear, and stops when the impact from
single counterparties becomes too small, i.e. when firms are sufficiently diversi-
fied. Here, we obtain similar results as shown in figure 7. Especially at larger
strength of debt cross-holdings wd, we observe that the total impact of an asset
price shock on all firms (Value ∆ = ∆̂Total) increases and then decreases with
increasing connectivity. There is no clearly defined contagion window though.
Instead, the phase transition of the underlying random network is invisible with
contagion – as quantified by ∆̂Total – starting to rise already at 〈k〉 > 0. Fur-
thermore, diversification can reduce contagion but never prevent it completely.
Overall, the appearance of a contagion maximum, akin to a window, is driven
by an intricate interplay in the amplification driven by equation (44): While
increasing connectivity in Md would lead to higher amplification, at the same
time the default probability drops and reduces amplification. Interestingly, both
effects balance each other in a way that the critical connectivity of the phase
transition is invisible, i.e. initially any connection quickly increases contagion.
On the other end, even at full connectivity contagion does not vanish as market
prices react to the potential contagion that would arise if firms default at matu-
rity. I.e. as long as the default probability is non-zero, market prices reflect the
potential credit risk and thus react to asset price shocks. This is also the reason
that the diversification benefit is limited by the extend to which the probability
of default is reduced. Further studies are certainly necessary to investigate and
understand the properties of ∆ and the other Greeks when applied in a network
context.
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Figure 6: Greeks ∆,V,Θ and ρ for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random cross-holding networks
depending on the spot price a0 of external assets. In all cases the average impact
of each firm on the equity, debt and value of all other firms is shown. Parameters
were chosen as in figure 5.
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Figure 7: ∆̂Total depending on the average number 〈k〉 of counterparties. Espe-
cially with large cross-holdings of debt wd the impact on the firm value exhibits a
contagion window. This arises from the interplay between the amplification due
to higher connectivity and the diversification benefit lowering the default prob-
ability. To illustrate this effect, the different lines – corresponding to different
asset spot prices a0 – are colored by default probability.
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5 Discussion
We have investigated network valuation models which extend structural credit
risk models to a multi-firm setup. Taking the resulting connection with deriva-
tive pricing seriously, we have shown how to compute network Greeks. Our
solution is analytic to the point where risk-neutral expectations taking ex-post
values at maturity to ex-ante market prices have to be evaluated. Nevertheless,
we have computed the network Greeks in large random cross-holding networks
via Monte-Carlo sampling. We believe that our model has great potential and
many merits for investigating and understanding systemic risk. First and fore-
most it is firmly routed in established theories of asset pricing, providing a sound
and principled approach for systemic risk analysis. From this perspective, we
advocate the view that the valuation of financial contracts and systemic risk
should not be studied as separate subjects, which has also been expressed by
Fischer. Furthermore, the following interesting observations have been derived
from the model: The effectiveness of contagion changes based on the distance to
default of firms. Especially debt cross-holdings are mostly invisible when firms
are running strong, yet amplify asset price shocks when firms become distressed.
Thus, effective management of systemic risk cannot be based on current mar-
ket prices alone but needs to include crisis scenarios. Second, network Greeks
provide a principled way for quantifying risk in financial networks, connecting
systemic risk research with well established risk management practices. In par-
ticular, we clarified the relation between our network ∆ and the threat index
proposed by Demange (2018). We believe that ∆ is preferable as it quantifies
the impact of asset price shocks at market, i.e. ex-ante, values and considers
the impact on the total firms value, instead of debt repayments alone. Third, in
the considered model, risk is redistributed differently between firms within the
network and external investors funding them. From their outside perspective
no amplification takes place with risk merely redistributed without much shar-
ing benefits between them. Finally, our framework is very general and applies
almost unchanged to extensions of the considered model. By including equity
cross-holdings the model is already more general than most studies of systemic
risk focusing on default contagion, i.e. arising from debt cross-holdings. Several
interesting questions suggest themselves for future research, e.g. cross-holding
of contracts with different seniorities (Fischer 2014) or roll-over and liquidity
risk as studied by He and Xiong (2012) in the case of single firms. While some
of these extensions appear immediate, the inclusion of dead-weight losses at
default Battiston et al. (2012) poses some challenges as the valuation becomes
non-continuous.
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A Proof of hypothesis 1
Proof. From corollary 1 and equation (40) we obtain[
us
ud
]
=
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
]−1 [
diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
]
(93)
⇔
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
] [
us
ud
]
=
[
diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
]
(94)
[
us
ud
]
=
[
diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
]
+
[
diag(ξ)M s diag(ξ)Md
diag(1n − ξ)M s diag(1n − ξ)Md
] [
us
ud
]
.
(95)
Thus, the partial drivatives are solutions of the fixed point
[
us
ud
]
= Tξ
[
us
ud
]
with Tξ denoting the map on the right hand side of equation (95). We now
show that (i) Tξ is monotonically increasing in both u
s and ud, and (ii) Tξ is a
contraction.
(i) Consider
[
u′s
u′d
]
≥
[
us
ud
]
. Then
Tξ
([
u′s
u′d
]
−
[
us
ud
])
=
[
diag(ξ)M s(u′s − us) diag(ξ)Md(u′d − ud)
diag(1n − ξ)M s(u′s − us) diag(1n − ξ)Md(u′d − ud)
]
≥
[
0
0
]
(96)
where the last inequality follows from u′s,d − us,d ≥ 0, ξ ∈ Rn and as-
sumption 1 stating that Ms,d ≥ 0.
(ii) To show that Tξ is a contraction, we compute∥∥∥∥Tξ [ u′su′d
]
− Tξ
[
us
ud
]∥∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥∥[ diag(ξ)M s diag(ξ)Mddiag(1n − ξ)M s diag(1n − ξ)Md
]([
u′s
u′d
]
−
[
us
ud
])∥∥∥∥
1
(97)
≤
∥∥∥∥[ diag(ξ)M s diag(ξ)Mddiag(1n − ξ)M s diag(1n − ξ)Md
]∥∥∥∥
1
∥∥∥∥[ u′su′d
]
−
[
us
ud
]∥∥∥∥
1
(98)
≤ λ
∥∥∥∥[ u′su′d
]
−
[
us
ud
]∥∥∥∥
1
(99)
where λ < 1 exists when assuming the slightly stronger requirement that∑
iM
s,d
i,j < 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n. The contraction then follows as all
columns of
[
diag(ξ)M s diag(ξ)Md
diag(1n − ξ)M s diag(1n − ξ)Md
]
sum to less than one
bounding its ‖·‖1 below one as well.
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By (ii) we know from Banach’s fixed point theorem that the iteration un+1 =
Tξun converges to the unique fixed point u
∗ from any initial condition u0.
Further, from (i) the convergence is strictly from above or below in both parts
us and ud when us,d ≥ (us,d)∗ or us,d ≤ (us,d)∗ respectively. Now denote the
solution with ξ with uξ, i.e. uξ = Tξuξ, and consider ξ
′ ≥ ξ, i.e. with more
firms being solvent. Then,
Tξ′
[
usξ
udξ
]
=
[
diag(ξ′) + diag(ξ′)M susξ + diag(ξ
′)Mdudξ
diag(1n − ξ′) + diag(1n − ξ′)M susξ + diag(1n − ξ′)Mdudξ
]
(100)
≥
≤
[
diag(ξ) + diag(ξ)M susξ + diag(ξ)M
dudξ
diag(1n − ξ) + diag(1n − ξ)M susξ + diag(1n − ξ)Mdudξ
]
(101)
and thus by monotone convergence usξ′ ≥ usξ and udξ′ ≤ udξ which is the desired
result.
B Relation with threat index
Here, we consider debt cross-holdings only, i.e. M s = 0. Then, the model in
equation (8) simplifies to
s = max
{
0,a+Mdr − d} , (102)
r = min
{
d,a+Mdr
}
(103)
and as the right-hand side does not depend on s it suffices to consider the
recovery values of debt r. Table 1 provides the translation between our notation
and the terminology of Demange (2018).
Demange model Our model
Interpretation Notation Notation Interpretation
Total liabilities l∗i =
∑
j lij di Nominal debt
Clearing ratio θi ∈ [0, 1] ridi NA
Repayment θil
∗
i ri Recovery value of debt
Operating cash flow zi ai External asset value
Total cash fow ai(θ) = zi +
∑
j θj lji vi = ai +
∑
jM
d
ijrj Firm value
Liabilities share Πij =
lij
l∗i
Mdji Investment fraction
Default set i ∈ D ξi = 0 Solvency vector
Table 1: Translation between our notation and the terminology of Demange
(2018).
Definition 1 by Demange (2018) now states that first ai(θ) ≥ zi and second
θi = 1 or ai(θ) = θil
∗
i hold. Translating into our notation this means that
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vi ≥ ai and that the recovery value of debt ri = θil∗i either equals di or vi if the
firm is insolvent. Thus, the constraints on the repayment ratio translate into
ri = min{di, vi} = min{di, ai +
∑
j
Mdijrj} (104)
as in our model. Matching the definitions of ai(θ) and vi we identify Π with
(Md)T .
Demange now considers the aggregate value of repayments V , i.e. V =∑
i θil
∗
i which we identify with V =
∑
i ri. Thus, we can express V as 0
Ts +
1Tr = (0; 1)Tx where 0 and 1 are n-dimensional vectors of zeros and ones
respectively. Using corollary 1, we can compute the partial derivative of V with
respect to external asset values as
∂V
∂a
=
∂
∂a
(0; 1)Tx(a) (105)
= (0; 1)T
[
I2n×2n − ∂
∂x
g(a,x)
]−1  diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
 (106)
= (0; 1)T
I2n×2n − diag(ξ; 1n − ξ)
 0 Md
0 Md
−1  diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)

(107)
=
(
0T ,1T (In×n − diag(1n − ξ)Md)−1
) diag(ξ)
diag(1n − ξ)
 (108)
= 1T (In×n − diag(1n − ξ)Md)−1 diag(1n − ξ) . (109)
Thus, denoting this row vector of partial derivatives with µT we find that
µ = diag(1n − ξ)T (ITn×n − (Md)T diag(1n − ξ)T )−11 (110)
= diag(1n − ξ)(ITn×n −Π diag(1n − ξ))−11 (111)
matches the definition proposed by Demange (2018).
C Solution for symmetric example
Here, we compute the market values of debt and equity in the symmetric ex-
ample assuming that the single external asset At follows a geometric Brownian
motion. In this case,
At = a0e
(r− 12σ2)t+σ
√
tZ (112)
where Z ∼ N (0, 1), i.e. At has a log normal distribution with parameters
µA = ln a0 + (r − 12σ2)t and σ2A = σ2t.
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C.1 Equity and debt value
By equation (26) the market value of equity is then
st = EQt [e−rτs∗(AT )] (113)
= e−rτEQt
[
EQt [s(AT )|ξ]
]
(114)
= e−rτ
(
0PQt [ξ = 0] + E
Q
t
[
AT − (1− wd)d
1− ws |ξT = 1
]
PQt [ξT = 1]
)
(115)
= e−rτ
(
1
1− wsE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 1]−
1− wd
1− ws d
)
PQt [ξT = 1] . (116)
Defining d± as in equation (82) the risk-neutral solvency probability can be
written as
PQt [ξT = 1] = P
Q
t [AT ≥ (1− wd)d] (117)
= 1− Φ(−d−) = Φ(d−) . (118)
Similarly, the conditional expectation derived from the log normal distribution
for AT reads as
EQt [AT |ξT = 1] = eln at+rτ
Φ(d+)
PQt [ξT = 1]
(119)
Similarly the market value of debt is computed as
rt = e
−rτ
(
1
1− wdE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 0](1− PQt [ξT = 1]) + d PQt [ξT = 1]
)
(120)
with the conditional expectation
EQt [AT |ξT = 0] = eln at+rτ
Φ(−d+)
1− PQt [ξT = 1]
. (121)
Finally, combining all equations we obtain the solution as given in equation
(80).
C.2 Greeks
To compute the Greeks in this example, we first compute the partial derivatives
of the solution x∗ = (s∗, r∗)T by corollary 1. Further, since all firms are sym-
metric and thus either all solvent or all insolvent, from equations (46) and (47)
we obtain:
∂s∗
∂a
=
{
0 if ξ = 0
1
1−ws if ξ = 1
(122)
∂r∗
∂a
=
{
1
1−wd if ξ = 0
0 if ξ = 1
. (123)
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Summing together equity and debt and taking expectations, the systemic risk
index pi is given as
pi = EQt [
∂s∗
∂AT
+
∂r∗
∂AT
]− 1 (124)
=
1
1− wsP
Q
t [ξ = 1] +
1
1− wd (1− P
Q
t [ξ = 1])− 1 . (125)
Next, we need the partial derivatives of AT with respect to the parameters
θ = (at, σ, r, τ) of interest:
AT
∂at
= e(r−
1
2σ
2)τ+σ
√
τZ =
AT
at
(126)
AT
∂σ
= AT
(−στ +√τZ) (127)
AT
∂r
= AT τ (128)
AT
∂τ
= AT
(
r − 1
2
σ2 +
1
2
σ√
τ
Z
)
. (129)
From equation (43) we finally obtain the Greeks:
∂
∂at
(
st
rt
)
=
e−rτ
at
(
1
1−wsP
Q
t [ξ = 1]E
Q
t [AT |ξT = 1]
1
1−wdP
Q
t [ξ = 0]E
Q
t [AT |ξT = 0]
)
(130)
∂
∂σ
(
st
rt
)
= e−rτ
(
1
1−wsP
Q
t [ξ = 1](−στEQt [AT |ξT = 1] +
√
τEQt [ATZ|ξT = 1])
1
1−wdP
Q
t [ξ = 0](−στEQt [AT |ξT = 0] +
√
τEQt [ATZ|ξT = 0])
)
(131)
∂
∂r
(
st
rt
)
= −τe−rτ
( (
1
1−wsE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 1]− 1−w
d
1−ws d
)
PQt [ξ = 1]
1
1−wdE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 0]PQt [ξT = 0] + d PQt [ξT = 1]
)
(132)
+ τe−rτ
(
1
1−wsP
Q
t [ξ = 1]E
Q
t [AT |ξT = 1]
1
1−wdP
Q
t [ξ = 0]E
Q
t [AT |ξT = 0]
)
(133)
= τe−rτd PQt [ξT = 1]
(
1−wd
1−ws
−1
)
(134)
∂
∂τ
(
st
rt
)
= −re−rτ
( (
1
1−wsE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 1]− 1−w
d
1−ws d
)
PQt [ξ = 1]
1
1−wdE
Q
t [AT |ξT = 0]PQt [ξT = 0] + d PQt [ξT = 1]
)
(135)
+ e−rτ
(
1
1−wsP
Q
t [ξ = 1]((r − 12σ2)EQt [AT |ξT = 1]− σ√τ EQt [ATZ|ξT = 1])
1
1−wdP
Q
t [ξ = 0]((r − 12σ2)EQt [AT |ξT = 0]− σ√τ EQt [ATZ|ξT = 0])
)
(136)
32
All terms in these formulas are analytic except for the conditional expectations
EQt [ATZ|ξT ] involving AT and Z jointly, which we leave as an exercise to the
reader. Instead, as a sanity check, we compare the two Greeks, namely ∆ and
ρ not involving this term with the corresponding results derived from Black-
Scholes formula.
∂
∂at
(
st
rt
)
=
( 1
1−wsΦ(d+)
1
1−wdΦ(−d+)
)
(137)
=
( 1
1−ws
∂
∂at
CBS(at, (1− wd)d, r, τ, σ)
1
1−wd
∂
∂at
(
e−rτ (1− wd)d− PBS(at, (1− wd)d, r, τ, σ)
) )
(138)
∂
∂r
(
st
rt
)
= τe−rτ (1− wd)d Φ(d−)
( 1
1−ws
− 1
1−wd
)
(139)
=
( 1
1−ws
∂
∂rCBS(at, (1− wd)d, r, τ, σ)
1
1−wd
∂
∂r
(
e−rτ (1− wd)d− PBS(at, (1− wd)d, r, τ, σ)
) )
(140)
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